



INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF



Executive Registry

82-3485/2

Here is another copy of my
memo for the record that I
somehow found its way back
to my office. Look forward to
hearing from you on Thursday.



INFORMATION

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19 April 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: ICS/OP

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SUBJECT: Observations and Recommendations on the Consumer Survey

1. Standing off from the confines of the Consumer Survey for a few moments provides an opportunity to incorporate a degree of personal experience into the more detached analysis attempted. A primary objective of the Working Group that nurtured the Survey for over a year was to obtain as much statistical information as possible on which to base our analysis. Too many past assessments of the intelligence product have been criticized for being too subjective for us to follow the same route. I believe we succeeded in providing a restrained analysis of the producer/consumer relationship, as reflected in the statistical data, and in the narrative comments.

2. The first observation to note for the record is that the analysis reveals little that has not been said before. Senior intelligence officers, junior intelligence officers, consumers, oversight bodies, and outside critics have weighed in at one time or another with many of the same observations. Little if anything has ever been done by producers, however, to respond to past recommendations with the critics generally dismissed as having no understanding of the intelligence process or of being too subjective. To a great extent, this explains the restrained tone of this analysis where little was proposed that could not be supported directly by the data.

3. A second observation is that where intelligence problems lend themselves to technical solutions, such as military questions, the Community can be relied upon to excel in its response, but where the issues are more ambiguous, such as political, economic, and military intentions, the responses tend to be less satisfactory. A number of factors enter into an explanation of this fact not the least of which is that it is far more difficult to explain than it is to count. Consumers also are far more prepared to challenge analyses than they are to dispute hard data. As important as these factors are they are not nearly as significant as the way the Community has chosen to address these two disparate forms of intelligence which is a function of its military origins.

4. I believe that the Community does poorly when it addresses intentions because it does so in the same manner it approaches military analysis. The latter is characterized by two components--verification and consensus--which are not necessary appropriate to the former. Military intelligence tends to reach only those conclusions which can be verified, and to postpone those where it is lacking. Conclusions are considered valid only if they have been coordinated by all interested parties even at the sacrifice of precision.

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5. This analytical approach may satisfy the consumers of military intelligence, but has proven to be inadequate when applied to the question of intentions. Intentions are seldom verified in an indisputable fashion, and lacking this, conclusions are difficult to coordinate. Undeniably, clandestine HUMINT sources, the sources likely to address intentions, are not as plentiful as might be desired, but to some extent at least this is something of a crutch. Consumers do not expect the same kind of verification they receive from military intelligence. Lacking verification, coordination renders the final product devoid of all meaningful detail. Here again, however, the consumer is not asking for consensus, but instead for a range of informed speculation and opinion.

6. The production elements of the Community have it within their power to alter their approach to the analysis of intentions, but it would require a drastic change in management style. The relatively poor record of providing consumers with analyses of intentions can be traced, I believe, to the steady concentration of management authority at ever higher levels to the point where line managers are little more than senior researchers. This has had the effect of standardizing much of the activity that is generated by the analytical offices, particularly production and promotions.

7. As the production system presently operates, it serves the needs of the production offices first and of consumers only secondarily. The Consumer Summary, for instance, highlights consumer indifference to a great many intelligence publications while noting their desire for more tailored intelligence support. A centralized production system, however, operates best on standardization. Thus, publications become the measure of support to the consumer and the basis on which promotions are decided internally. Consumer needs for intelligence support are so diverse that they cannot be met satisfactorily by a system that demands uniformity; the variety of opinion many consumers found lacking cannot possibly surface under such a management style.

8. I have several recommendations that address these shortcomings, all of which are next to impossible to implement given the investments in the present system. They are:

- a. Reduce the number of periodicals and self-generated topical publications.

A significant portion of these are barely read, and only consume time that might better be devoted to responding to specific consumer requests. Many analysts complain that they do not have the time to keep current on their subject while meeting the demands of both production schedules and individual consumer needs. They have a legitimate point, unfortunately the system eliminated the wrong service.

- b. Diffuse responsibility for consumer satisfaction and performance evaluation.

Require each branch and division chief and office director to identify their consumers. Ask these consumers to evaluate the support they received over the course of a year, and base performance

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evaluations on these ratings; also, hold each level of management responsible for the performance of their subordinates. Leave it to line management to best determine what their particular mix of consumers require in the way of intelligence support.

- c. Move the CIA's DDI downtown in close proximity to its consumers.

The CIA presently is investigating solutions to its space requirements, and the solution to date seems to be to build more office space at Langley. The headquarters building may serve the needs of the other directorates satisfactorily, but it has served only to heighten the sense of separation from the consumer on the part of the producer. While a move downtown is not sufficient to bring about a closer producer/consumer relationship, it might well be a necessary ingredient.



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WFO to OASD, CT